RESIDENTIAL REAL PROPERTY DISCLOSURE ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO UNINHABITABLE HOUSE

Couple more cases of note from the Appellate Court...

In Grady v. Sikorski the First District Appellate Court was faced with a novel question - did the Illinois Residential Real Property Disclosure Act apply to a transaction where the structure on the property is an uninhabitable building? The Act basically provides that when selling residential real estate, the seller must complete a form basically certifying that seller is unaware of any problems regarding flooding, foundation cracks, plumbing problems, termites or other problems. In the Grady case, the property Ms. Grady wanted to buy was located on North Damen and consisted of a lot with a two story building. Grady intended to knock it down and build condos. When she toured the building it was stripped and lacked the basic amenities to live, like water, lighting, furnace etc. After purchase, she learned the building was on soft soil to a depth of 27 feet. In order to put the building up, she had to use caissons, or large support structures she hadn't planned on using. She incurred additional expense of some $60,000. She sued Sikorski under the Act for not telling her about the soil. Discovery revealed he knew about the soil but did not tell Grady. His lawyer said a disclosure form wasn't done because it was a vacant property. The case went to trial and Sikorski won. Grady appealed. The Appellate Court upheld the lower court. The Appellate Court ruled that the Act doesn't apply to property that includes an uninhabitable structure. Okay as far as the statutory cause of action goes. But what about fraud? If the seller knew the buyer wanted to tear the building down and rebuild, the soil quality was an obvious issue. And the seller didn't provide important information to the buyer[information the seller had in his possession indicating the soil was soft]. Hopefully there was a fraud count in the complaint.

INJURY GETTING OUT OF CAR ISN'T A COMP INJURY

In Vill v. Loyola, a security guard brought a Workers' Comp claim after being injured in the Loyola Hospital parking lot. After arriving at work, she parked in lot 15; the only lot in which security personnel were allowed to park. The lot was crowded that day and she was kind of boxed into the spot. She testified that as she tried to squeeze out of the car, she twisted her knee and her foot got caught and she suffered injuries to her left foot. She ultimately was off work some 3 months and went to trial on her comp claim. She won at trial, with the arbitrator ordering her employer to pay her some medical expenses and TTD. Loyola appealed ot the Industrial Commission. The Commission reversed the arbitrator, saying she didn't prove she received her injuries due to her employment. The employee appealed to the Circuit Court of Cook County which upheld the ruling. The worker then appealed to the Appellate Court - to no avail. The Court found that she was hurt trying to squeeze out of her car, a risk that faces all members of the public who drive. The Court upheld the decision of the Circuit Court.

This case impacts on a very similar case I have against a local hospital. I represent a nurse who suffered a terrible fracture of her leg after slipping on metal near the entry door off the lot in which she parked. In my case, the employer told he where to park - she had no other choice. I am hoping that carries the day for me, but this decision doesn't particularly help.